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THE VENUE OF PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS*

Paul E. Ba;,yet

W

ITH the division of each state into counties or districts and the
creation in each such subdivision of some court for the probate
of wills and the administration of estates, it became necessary to designate which of such courts should undertake these functions in a particular estate. It is not the purpose of this study to consider ·problems arising out of conflicts of jurisdiction as between states insofar as independent determinations of domicile of a decedent may be made. That a
decedent died a resident of the state undertaking an administration
upon his estate-will be assumed; or, if he died a nonresident, that there
are assets within the state justifying administration. This study is concerned solely with the designation and determination of the county within
the state where such probate and administration should be entertained
and carried out.
Historically, venue in civil actions meant the county iri England to
which process was issued to the sheriff to bring a jury from th;at county
to Westminster, and later to the county in which the trial was to be
had. This fitted in well with the procedural plan .then prevailing· for
summoning the jurors, who were presumably acquainted with the facts,
from the very community where the cause of action arose.' But when
jurors ceased to make findings on their own knowledge, a jury could be
drawn from the community of trial, and at the same time it became possible-indeed necessary-to determine venue in advance of trial. It is
not possible here to trace the elements which have found their way into
statutes for determining venue in civil actions. Suffice it to say that
these statutes bear various marks of the pl~ce where the cause of action

*

This is the second of a series of articles on probate law written in connection
with a study of probate statutes and the drafting of a Model Probate Code for the
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar .Association.
See Patton, "Preparation of a Model Probate Code," 42 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1944).
The· first article, written jointly by Professor Lewis M. Simes and Paul E. Basye,
entitled "The Organization of the Probate Court jn America," appeared -in 42 MICH.
L. REv. 965 (1944) and 43 MicH. L. REv. 113 (1944).
A.B., U~iversity of Missouri; J.D., University of Chicago; LL.M., University of
Michigan. Research Associate, University of Michigan Law School. Member from
California of Committee on Improvement of Probate Statutes, Probate Division, Section
of Real Pr_operty, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar Association.
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arose, where one or more of the parties to the action resided, or where
the defendant might be found. 1
In the English ecclesiastical courts venue for determining the
place of administration upon the estate of a decedent developed in a
wholly different setting. The ordinary ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction to probate wills and grant letters upon the estate of a decedent who
died, or who was domiciled, within the diocese. 2 Where, however, the
decedent was possessed of bona notabilia ( effects of a certain value,
usually in excess of £ 5, but an amount varying in different places and
often dependent upon fine distinctions as to the nature of the property) 8 in another diocese, probate and administration were granted by
the Prerogative Court of Canterbury or York. 4 And where personal
property existed in both provinces two probates and grants of letters
were necessary. 5 Also, if it appeared, after letters were duly granted by
an ordinary ecclesiastical court, that the decedent was possessed of bona
notabilia within another jurisdiction, the probate and administration
were held to be void. 6 Because of the ill-defined nature and varying
amounts of bona notabilia, the difficulties; inconveniences and mistakes
incident to the retention of such doctrine in the law and the consequences of void probates and administrations, the royal commissioners,
in r 83 2, recommended the abolition of all ecclesiastical probate jurisdiction. 7 This recommendation was translated into an accomplished fact
in r 857 at which time courts of probate were established fully coordinate with the common-law courts at Westminster. 8
The doctrine of bona notabilia never found its way into this
country.0 It is true that vestiges of the practice of requiring separate
administrations on decedents' estates where property was found in more
1

For a discussion of this development, see I CHITTY, PLEADING, 267 et seq.
(1809); STEPHEN, PLEADING, Tyler ed., 268 et seq. (1924); 5 HoLDSWORTH, HrsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 2d ed., l 17-119, -4-0-142 (1924); Foster, "Place of Trial in
Civil Actions," 43 HARV. L. REv. 1217 (1930).
2
BURN, EccLESIASTICAL LAw, 9th ed., by Phillimore, 292-293 (1842).
3
Id. at 294-296.
4
Id. at 293.
.
5 Id. at 296. See also REPORT BY THE CoMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE
PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
23 (1832).
6 REPORT BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JuRisDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL Cou~TS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 23 (1832).
7~

8
9

•

20-21 Viet., c. 77, p. 423 (1857).
ln the Matter of Coursen's Will, 4 N.J. Eq. 408 at 414 (1843).
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than one county may be noted in some early American sta,tutes.10 At
the present time, however, the jurisdiction of a probate court extends
to all property of a decedent in any county in the state. But what county
do the statutes designate for the probate of wills and the administration of estates, and what county should they designate in the interest
of convenience and efficiency?
Such designation should primarily serve the ends of convenience,
and aid in the prompt and efficient administration of estates. In laying
down general rules designed to serve those ends it may be expectC?d
that a certain degree of arbitrariness will appear,-but it shocld be kept
at a minimum. Fixed rules seem largely to prevail in many old statutes
still operating at the present time. i\.lthough some of these statutes
served well enough in former times when one's domicile, that of his
nearest of kin, and most of his property were all likely to be ,confined to
a single county, they are not always the most satisfactory under modern
conditions. The sole justification for fixed rules in determining venue
lies in the necessity for having something predetermin~d to go by, .and_
in resolving conflicts when they do occur. A definite trend· away fro_m
an absolute fixation of venue is clearly evident in the more recent probate statutes and codes,11 particularly in the case of nonr~idents. As
will be observed from the text of the proposed Model Probate Code12 a
10

See, for example, Act of 1733, c, 5 in 2 Acts and Resolves of the Province of
Massachusetts Bay, 1715-1741, p. 689 (1774).
11
Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3799 and 3807; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 732.06;
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) §§ II3-702 and II3-12u; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939)
§ 10763; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2203; Me. Rev. Stat.
(1930) c. 75, § 9; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215., § 3; Mich. Stat. Ann. ,
(1943) §§ 27.3178 (19), (98) and (120); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82; Neb.
Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 30-313; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer~ Supp. 1941)
§ 9882.01; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, § 8; N.C. Gen. Stat. Aim. (1935) §
28-1; N.D. C<;imp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8526; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Fage, 1937j §
105u-4; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § 3; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938)
§ 8145; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2725; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932)
§ 1376; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 311.01.
12
Section IOI of the Model Probate Code dealing with venue for the purposes of
probate of wills and for all subsequent proceedings in connection with the administration of estates is as follows:
"Venue. The venue for the probate of a will and for administration shall be:
"(a) In the county in this state where the decedent had his domicile at the time
of his death;
"(b) If the decedent had no domicile in this state, then in any county wherein
he left any property •or into which any property belonging to his estate may have come.
"If proceedings are instituted in more than o~e county, they shall be stayesl except
in the county where first commenced until final determination of venue in such county
.,._
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maximum latitude of choice is given to those who will ordinarily take
the initiative in such matters, on the assumption that convenie~ce will
govern that choice within the permitted limits.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the statutes under consideration are statutes of venue and not statutes upon which the jurisdiction of courts is predic.ated. Jurisdiction means power to hear and
adjudicate.13 Venue refers only to the choice or designation of a particular county in which the probate proceedings should be instituted and
carried through to completion.14 Power or jurisdiction to entertain and
supervise the ?,dministration of estates is conferred generally upon probate courts; venue is the means of dividing or 'allocating the work
among all of the probate courts in the state.15 It has even been suggested that there is but one probate court in each state with a branch
in each county.16
where .first commenced. If the proper venue is .finally determined to be in another
county, the court, after making and retaining a true copy of the entire file, shall transmit the original to the proper county.
"For this purpose, such proceeding shall be commenced by the filing of a petition;
and the proceeding .first legally commenced shall extend to all of the property of the
estate in this state.
"If it appears to the court at any time before the .final decree in any proceeding
that said proceeding was commenced in the wrong county or that it would be for the
best interests of the estate, the court, in its discretion, may order the proceeding with
all papers, files and a certified copy of all orders therein transferred to another probate
court in the same or other county, which other court shall thereupon proceed to complete
said administration proceeding as if originally commenced therein.''
18
I BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 274 (1935).
14
1 BEALE, CoNFLICTOFLAws 115 (1935).
15
ln lhe words of Mr. Justice Rugg, "The distinction between jurisdiction and
venue js plainly established.••. Jurisdiction is a term of comprehensive import. It concerns and de.fines the power of judicatories and court. It embraces every kind of judicial
actfon touching the subject of the action, suit, petition, complaint, indictment or other
proceeding. It includes power to inquire into facts, to apply the law, to make decision
and to declare judgment.•.. Venue in its modern and municipal sense relates to and
de.fines the particular county or territorial area within the State or district in which the
cause or prosecution must be brought or tried. It commonly has to do with geographical
subdivisions, relates to practice or procedure,· may be waived, and does not refer to
jurisdiction at all.•.•" Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482 at 483-484, 130 N.E. 177
(1921).
See also Southern Sand and Gravel Co., Inc. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel Corp.,
145 Va. 317, 133 S.E. 812 (1926); In re Summer.field's Estate, 158 Kan. 380, 147
P. {2d) 759 (1944).
.
16
In re Estate of Davidson, 168 Minn. 147 at 151, 219 N.W. 40 (1926).
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FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE VENUE

A. A Venue Statute, not a Jurisdiction Statute
_ Under the early statutes designating the particular court in which
wills should be probated and administration granted it was usually provided that the court in the county wherein the deceased resided at the
time of his death should have "jurisdiction" to grant probate and letters
of administration. Death and residence within the county were essential "jurisdictional" facts to be alleged and found by the court. But if
either of these was not true in fact, it was said that all proceedings
were utterly void and could be attacked at any time, direcµy or in- •
directly. Notice to interested parties giyen by a court without jurisdiction was regarded as no notice at all. "The persons interested cannot be
required to watch the proceedings of all the Probate Courts of the
State, at all times," said the California Court in an early case.11 "The
proceedings are summary and special, and must be in strict conformity
with the law." Such was the common attitude toward pro~ate courts,
at that time regarded as inferior tribunals whose proceedings must conform in fact to every requirement of the statute.
In the course of time a very substantial body of authority accumu..:
lated which construed such statutes as limiting the jurisdic~ion of probate courts to the administration of estates of decedents who had actually died domiciled within their geographical limits; yet despite the
court's own determination of this so-called "jurisdictionaW fact, such
determination remained open to attack in subsequent and collateral proceedings. The result was chaotic. Several administrations could be
instituted and carried on in different counties at the same time, and
debtors subjected to multitudinous actions by different executors or
administrators of the same estate. Confusio11: and uncertainty were in
the ascendan,t. No one could depend upon the title to property obtained
through a probate sale. The net effect on titles to real estate was well
nigh disastrous.
Gradually, however, the position of probate courts has risen in the
law's esteem. Made courts of record in .t;nost states, accorded presumptions by statute as to the validity and regularity of their proceedings,
and made coordinate with courts of general jurisdiction in a: few states;
they began to lose their inferiority.18 The utterly indefensible, holdings
17

Beckett v. Selover, 7 Cal. 215 at 237 (1857).
See Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in America,"
42 MICH. L. REv. 965 at 982 et seq. (1944).
18
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that the jurisdiction of probate courts could ~e attacked collaterally at
any time and all dependent proceedings held for nought were destined
to fall. Faith in judicial proceedings was felt to be just as important
in probate matters as elsewhere. A court may erroneously assume to act
in a given case. Today its action may be erroneous but ordinarily it is
not void.
Nevertheless there remains a small Body of authority which continues to construe venue statutes as limiting the jurisdiction of probate
courts and making their determinations of jurisdiction inconclusive.
Two administration proceedings may be carried on simultaneously, and
third parties subjected to two actions for the same thing, without any
assurance as to which will be upheld. Fortunately, however, this possibility is confined to two states at the most and is not likely to survive
much longer the tests of time and necessity.

B. Estates of Resident Decedents
In formulating a statute specifying the county where the will of a
resident decedent should be probated and his estate administered upon,
convenience of the persons interested should control.19 Two elements
exist here: con:venience as to assets of the estate; and convenience as to
parties. Both of these may and usually do suggest the same place.
Assets may consist of land, tangible personalty, intangible personalty,
and causes of action to be instituted or prosecuted. At times there may
be actions to be defended. The various par.ties involved include heirs
and distributees, witnesses who may be called upon to prove the will or
to testify in proceedings, and persons to be consulted by the executor
or administrator in connection with the administration of the estate.
For resident decedents, the designation in every statute of the
venue for probate and administration is the county of residence or domicile.20 In the vast majority of cases this wiJl be the most convenient
10

"The policy of the statute in fixing venue is the convenience of the parties.
It is a mere privilege of the defendant which he may waive, if he wishes, and which
he will be deemed to have waived, unless he raised the objection in the manner prescribed by statute. On the other hand, the policy of the statute in fixing jurisdiction is
to determine the character or nature of the cause of which the several courts of the
state ,may take cognizance, which cannot be enlarged or defeated by any act of the
parties. Neither consent nor waiver can confer jurisdiction, though it may admit
venue." Concurring opinion in Southern Sand and Gravel Co., Inc. v. Massaponax Sand
and Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 317 at 332, 133 S.E. 812 (1926).
20 Only one significant deviation from this universal formula has been noted.
In Alabama a testator may designate the county where administration is to be had on his
estate provided he owns property in such county at the time of his death. Ala. Code
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place in terms of the elements mentioned. On the basis of convenience
and of the universal acceptance of this single formula in the case of resident decedents, its retention seems a desirable one.
The phraseology of all present statutes is to the effect that administration is to be had in the county in which the decedent was. a resident
or an inhabitant or where he was domiciled. A very few designate venue
as the county where he had his mansion house. 21 All of these phrases
are interpreted as equivalent to domicile. 22 A few.recent statutes employ the term "domicile" 28 because it has a more definite and fixed
legal meaning. This would seem to \Je the preferable term for determmmg venue.

C. Estates of N onr(!sident Decedents
In the case of nonresident decedents the factors determining venue
are quite different in "most cases. The domidle of the decedent and presumably of his family has been elsewhere. The convenience of the
heirs and distributees must be in terms of access to the assets of the
estate and to the place of administration. Convenience foi;- the executor
or administrator may correspond or differ. Localization of assets is no
longer even a theoretical possibility.u Both tangible and intangible
Ann. ( 1940) tit. 6 I, § 3 5. Another section provides that when a .resident decedent
dies intestate and leaves no assets subject to administration in the county of.his residence,
and no administration is granted in such county within three months after his death,
then administration may be granted in any county where he leaves assets. Ala. Code
Ann. ( 1940) tit. 61, § 80. Both of these sections are designed to serve the interests of
con;venience.
In all the citations which follow, reference is made to provisions dealing with the
probate of wills as well as administration upon estates. A few statutes are' explicit to
the effect that if probate is had in a given court, administration must also· be had there,
and vice versa. Others are silent on the subject. While either may be had without
the other, clearly they should be in the same court even though not applied for at the
same time.
21
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 206; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) '
art. 93, § 15; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 4; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-103;
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5247; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 4064.
22
See ATKINSONi WILLS 560 (1937). Only one dissent from this has been found
-----an early dictum to the effect that "inhabitant" is a narrower term than "domicile"which would have little weight today in view of the universal accept3:nee to the contrary. Holmes v. Ore. & Cal. Ry., 6 Sawy. 276, (D:C. Ore. 1881) 5 F. 523.
28
The term "domicile" is used in the statutes of Florida, North Carolina, Ohio
and Texas. Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 732.06; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943)
§ 28-1; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10504-15 (probate of will only); Tex.
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3293.
24
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939).

478

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 43

assets may be located in several counties. Consequently it is not surprising to find each state groping for its own formpla, each predicated
upon some assumed relation between the localization q,f assets and the
place of administration.
In nearly all of the existing statutes designating venue in cases of
nonresidents, elaborate provisions are found specifying one or more of
the following places as th_e venue for administration: the county (I)
where the decedent's land or the greater part ( or any part) thereof
lies; 25 ( 2) where his personal estate or the greater part ( or any part)
thereof is located; 26 (3) where his estate or the greater part ( or any
part) thereof is located; 21 (4) where the decedent died; 28 (5) where
25

Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 5 and 14529; Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936)
§ 113-702 (where land devised); Ill. Ann Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 206;
Ky. ReT. Stat. (1942) §§ 394.140 and 395.030; La. Civ. Co.de (Dart, 1932) art. 935
(immovable property); Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 495 (where land devised); Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 4 and 531; N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 3:2-41 (where land
devised); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-'103; N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill,
1937) § 45; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 19-206 and 19-210 (only if jurisdiction has not been assumed under other subdivisions of § 19-210); Va. Code -Ann.
(Michie, 1942) §§ 5247 and 5360; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 4064
and 4123 (where land devised); Wis. Stat. (1943) § 310.08 (as to probate of wills).
26
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, § 71; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1941) c. 3, § 206; La. Civ. Code Ann'. (Dart, 1932) art. 935; Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939) art: 93, §§ 15, 45, and 356; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 495 and 525;
·N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-103; N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 45.
27
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 5 and 14529; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) §§
4888 and 4904; Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3799 and 3807; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941)
§ 732.06; Ga. Code Ann. (Parke, 1936) § 113-1211; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§ 6-2q1, §§ 6-302 and 7-403; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) §
59.2203; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §§ 394.140 and 395.030; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c.
75, § 9; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 3; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§
27.3178 (19),. (98) and (120); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82; Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(1942) §'4; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10018; Neb.
Comp. Stat. (Dorsey, 1929); §§ 30-215 and 30-313; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer,
Supp. 1941) § 9882.01; N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, §§ 8 and 9; N.M. Stat.
Ann. (1941) § 33-103; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-1; N.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. (1913) § 8526; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §§ 10504-15,
10511-4; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §§ 341 and 1862; R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. (1938) c. 569, § 3; S.C. Cod~ (1942) §§ 120, 211, 8930 and 8968; Tenn.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 8145; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3293;
Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-1-2; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2735; Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1942) §§ 5247, 5360; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1376;
W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) §§ 4064 and 4123; Wis. Stat. (1943) §§ 253.03
and 311.01; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-207.
·
28
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 5 and 14529; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §§
394.140 and 395.030; La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1932) art. 935; Md. Ann. Code
(Flack, 1939) art. 93, §§ 15 and 356; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 495 and 525;
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he died and left assets; 29 ( 6) where he leaves assets, having died out of
the state; so ( 7) where he leaves estate, having left no estate within the
county where he died; 81 (8) where assets come after his death; 82 (9)
where there may be any debt or demand owing to him; 83 (rn) where
the personal representative or kin of such person has a cause of action;u
or ( r r) where any suit in which the estate is interested is to be ~rought,
prosecuted or defended. 85 And in most of them preference or priority
is prescribed in a designated order, though all too often without regard
to the convenience of anyone. In some instances the presence of land in
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 4 and 531; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 13-103;.N.Y.
Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 45; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943)
§ 28.:.1; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3293; Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
1942) §§ 5247 and 5360; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1376; W. Va.
Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) §§ 4064 and 4123.
29
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, §§ 35 and 80; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §
38-101; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 301; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 15-101;
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, I 93 5) § 100 I 8; Okla. Stat. Ann.
(194'i:) tit. 58, § 5; Ore. Comp: Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 19-206 and 19-210; S.D.
Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0101; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-1-2; Wyo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-207:
so Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-101,; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 301;
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 15-101; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 6-201, 6-302
and 7-403; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §:10018; N.Y.
Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 45; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §
28-1; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 5; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 19-206
and 19-216; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0101; Utah. Code Ann. (1943) § 102-1-2;
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1376; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943)
§§4064 and 4123; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.03 (as to probate of wills); Wyo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-207.
31
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-101; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 301;
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §§ 15-101 and 15-102; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson &
McFarland, 1935) § 10018; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58; § 5; S.D. Code Ann.
(1939) § 35.0101; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-1-2; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-207.
.
82
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, §§ 35 and 80; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§§ 6-201, 6-302 and 7-403; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) §§ 10763 and 11825;
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 9; Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82; N.y. Surrogate's
Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 45; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) §· 28-1; Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 19-206 and 19-210; Tenn. Code Ann; (Michie, 1938)
§ 8145.
.
88
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 14529; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 732.06; Ky.
Rev. Stat. (1942) §§ 394.1_40 and 395.030; N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill,
1937) §§ 45 and 46; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 105u-4; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § 3; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 8145.
HN.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 346, § 8; N.Y. Sur;ogate's, C~ui;t Act (Cahill,
1937) § 45.
85
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 8145.
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the state gives precedence over personalty in the determination of
venue. 36 In other statutes the very opposite is true. 37 It is not easy to
reconcile these different forms or amounts of wealth as a basis for determining venue. The place of death itself would seem to bear no relation
to the convenience of anyone insofar as the task of administration is concerned, and yet the county of death is designated as the venue in a surprisingly large number of states, due, no doubt, to the persistent influence of the English ecclesiastical courts, which sometimes authorized
probate and administration in the diocese where death occurred.86 The
_proximity of the executor, administrator and distributees to the assets
of the estate would ordinarily serve their convenience better than an administration in a distant county compelled by the provisions of an arbitrary statute. The importance of this matter can be appreciated where
property is to be looked after, rents collected, or a business continued or
liquidated.
·
After the varied provisions of all the statutes are compared and considered, it seems clear that little advantage is to be gained by a rigid
designation of venue. Choice within limits might well be left to those
· persons who will take the initiative in applying for letters and who will
likely be appointed to undertake the task of looking after the estate.30
A statute with :flexible provisions permitting a degree of freedom may
be considered as operating in a med;um of individual choices; and in
most cases individual choices will be guided largely by convenience.
Doubtless this objective has been paramount in those states having
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 5 and 14529; Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1941) c. 3, § 206; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) §§ 394.140 and 395.030; La. Civ. Code
Ann. (Dart, 1932) art. 935; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 495 (probate of wills); Mo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 4 and 531; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 33-103; Va. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5247 and 5360; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 4064.
37
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) c. 176, § 71; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939)
art. 93, §§ 15 and 356; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 525 (letters of administration);
N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 45.
38 BuRN, EccLESIASTICAL LAw, 9th ed. by Phillimore, 292-293 (1842).
39 One Texas statute goes so far as to permit administration in the county of applicant's residence where the only purpose is to appoint an administrator to receive funds
from the Federal Government. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3293A. A
companion statute, based upon presumed convenience, Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,
1939) art. 3293, provides that administration on the estate of a nonresident decedent
who died out of the state may be had in the county where his next of kin reside.
As the last of several enumerated places of venue in Missouri, probate and administration may be granted in any county in the state. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 4
and"531.
·
These are but isolated instances confined within a narrow compass.
36
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statutes authorizing probate and administration of the estate of a nonresident in any county in which assets of the decedent are located. The
presence in any county of assets belonging or due to an estate is an
essential and at the same time sufficient condition for a probate court to
entertain proceedings for the administration of the estate of a nonresident.

II.

PowER

OF PROBATE

CouRTS TO DETERMINE VENUE

In order for a probate court to grant letters testamentary or of administration there must first be a showing of death. To invoke action
by a particular probate court it must be shown secondly that the decedent was domiciled in the county at the time of his death, or, in the case
of a nonresident ( under the terms of many present statutes), that he
died within the county or that some part of his property is located
within the county. 40 The judicial determination of the existence of these
facts is the basis upon which all subsequent proceedings depend. The
important thing to observe in this connection is that the same tribunal
which proposes to undertake the administration of an estate also passes
upon the very facts necessary to entitle it to do so. This necessity and
power to make such a determination corresponds to a similar necessity
and power long recognized to exist in courts of general jurisdiction.
And such a determination must conclude other courts in the same state.
These two facts are often called "jurisdictional facts." 41 Only death
is strictly a jurisdictional fact. If the alleged decedent were not dead,
the proceedings purporting to administer and distribute his property
would be wholly void. 42 The second fact--of domicile within the
county, or death within or the location of assets within the county in the
case of a nonresident decedent-is not truly a jurisdictional fact, although many courts have so treated it, as will be pointed out presently.
A court may entertain and allow an administration to proceed to completion, as if local domicile were a reality. At most the statutory directions for venue are violated. This is not deemed a serious error as long
as there is no conflict with a probate court in another county, and it
40

ATKINSoN, W1LLS § 205 (1937); 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §§ 204-207 (1923).
u See 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §§ 204, 208
(1923).
42
Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 14 S. Ct. II08 {1894); ATKINSON, WILLS §
205 (1937); 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed.,§ 208 (1923).
We are not here considering the statutes authorizing administration up0n estates of
absentees.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

would serve no useful purpose to require a new and separate administration again in another county. Indeed positive harm is more likely to
result if duplicate proceedings are permitted.43 Consequently, a finding
of th_is jurisdictional fact ( domicile in the case of a resident or corresponding fact in the case of a nonresident) should be treated as binding and conclusive and not subject to collateral attack.-14 Any assault
upon such a determination should be made directly or by appeal.

III.

CONFLICTS OF VENUE

·A. As to Resident Decedents
Despite the avowed purpose of statutes to limit the supervision of
· decedents' estates to one probate court, it is easily possible that administrations may be commenced independently in two or more counties within the same state more or less simultaneously. In the case of
resident decedents it may be alleged and judicially determined by each
of two or more probate courts that the decedent died domiciled in the
same county where the court is located. This has happened in a number
of instances. Let us look into the results of such competing jurisdictions.
In the first place this duplication, or possibly triplication, of effort is
quite unnecessary. There is no justification for more than one tribunal
to undertake the administration. In the second place an unseemly competition between two courts of equal jurisdiction is highly undesirable.
Such judicial rivalry cannot be tolerated under any system. Furthermore, confusion, uncertainty and positive injustices may result. Each of
two or more executors or administrators may seek to take possession of
the same assets belonging to the estate; each may seek to recover debts
owing to the estate. In either situation a person may be subjected to
more than one action brought for the same purpose. An interpleader or
corresponding remedy is possible for such a person, but he would be
justified in feeling that a properly drafted probate code should eliminate such a possibility. Real estate titles traced through an administration
may be subject to different paths and different ownerships, depending
upon which administration is regarded as the controlling one. Such a
43
For a case illustrating how far such conflicts may go, see State ex rel. Carter v.
Hall, 141 Mo. App. 642, 125 S.W. 559 (1910) where one probate court ordered an
examination to discover assets held by the administrator to whom letters had been first
granted in another county, and threatened contempt proceedings for refusal.
44
Explicit statutes precluding collateral attack are now found in many states. See
notes 66-78 infra.
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condition still persists in Kentucky and R}lode Island. 45 It existep. ,in
Kansas until remedied by the probate code adopted there in 1939.46
Many other states likewise formerly adhered to this view.47
Where such a view prevailed in the past, one difficulty was no
doubt due to the judicial construction of the local statutes, many of
which were phrased in terms of "jurisdicti0n" rather than "venue."
Residence was "jurisdictional" and always open to question. Thus the
present statutes in Georgia,48 Iowa,49 Kentucky,5° Maine,51 Massachusetts,52 Michigan,58 Montana/' New York,5 5 North Car0lina,56 North
Dakota,57 Ohio,5 8 Oregon,5 9 Virginia,6° West Virginia,61 Wisconsin,62
and Wyoming 68 are unfortunately phrased in terms of jurisdiction.
Where collateral attacks have been permitted, courts have treated
45
Miller v. Swan, 91 Ky. 36, 14 S.W. 964 (1.890); People's Savi,ngs Bank v.
Wilcox, 15 R.I. 258, 3 A. 211 (1886). Tlfe same rule prevailed in Kansas prior to
the adoption of the new probate code there in 1939. See Ewing v. Mallison, 65 Kan.
484, 70 P. 369 (1902); Dresser v. Fourth Natl. Bank, IOI Kan. 401, 168 P. 672
(1917); In-re Summer.field's Estate, 158 Kan. 380, 147 P. (2d) 759 (194.4). For a
fuller citation of authority see ATKINSON, WILLS 560 (1937); 2 WOERNER, AMERICAN
LAW oF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 672 (1923); Evans, "The Venue of Probate Pro.ceedings in Kentucky," 6 KY. ST. B. J. 13 (Dec. 1941).
✓
The soundness of the Rhode Island position has recently been questioned by its
supreme court in Eckilson v. Greene, 61 R.I. 394, I A. (2d) II7 (1938) in view of
R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 569, § 1, enacted since the decision in the Wilcox case to
the effect that ''The jurisdiction assumed in any case by the court, ·so far as it
depends on the place of residence of a person, shall not be contested in any suit or
proceedings except in the original case or an appeal therein or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record."
46
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2203. See also 2 BARTLE'IT,
KANSAS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 999 (1939).
47
See 2 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 673 (iI923).
48
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) § n3-603.
•
49
Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 10763.
5
°Ky. Rev. Stat. (1942) § 395.030.
61
Me. Rev. Stat. ( l 930) c. 7 5, § 9·
52
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 3.
68
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 27.3178 (19) and (120).
51 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10018.
55
N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) §§ 44, 45, 46 and 47.
56
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-1.
57
N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8526,
58
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10504-15.
59
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1941) § 19-210.
60
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5247.
61
W. Va. Code Anh. (Michie, 1943) §§ 4064 and 4123.
62 Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.03.
68
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-207.
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domicile as jurisdictional.64 But· if such a· statute is construed as a venue
statute, as is now done in µearly all states, then the probate court first
assuming jurisdiction over the administration_ of a resident decedent's
estate by appropriate proceedings is entitled to retain such jurisdiction
and to exercise it exclusive of every othei: probate court in the state.65
When proceedings have been begun in two separate probate courts
more or less simultaneously, the determination of priority may.be simply resoived by requiring courts in which "proceedings are commenced"
second in point of time to withhold action so long as jurisdiction over
the estate has been assumed and continues to be exercised by the first
court. In other words, such jurisdiction first assumed by one court is not
subject to collateral attack. The applicable Wisconsin statute 66 is
typical:
"The jurisdiction assumed by any county court in any case, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of any person or the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in any action or proceeding whatsoever except on appeal from the county court in the
original case or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the same
record."
·
The same language, in substance, is contained in the statutes of California, 67 Kansas, 68 Maine,69 Massachusetts,7° Michigan,71 Minnesota,12
See Evans, "The Venue of Probate Proceedings in Kentucky," 6 KY. ST. B. J.
13 (Dec. 1941).
65 Atkinson, "Old Principles and New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure," 23 J. AM. Juo. Soc. 137 at 138 (1939).
66
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.05.
~
67
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 302.
68 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-223. The method used
here provides for a stay in all courts except the first, until the question of venue is
finally determined. See note 12 for form of this statute as it appears in the Model
Probate Code.
69
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 16.
70 Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 2. The statute of the form mentioned was superseded by the present statute in l 891 when probate courts were made
courts of general jurisdiction. In Kennedy v. Simmons, 308 Mass. 431 at 432, 32
N.E. (2d) 215 (1941) it is stated that the former statute was no longer necessary because under the new statute the decrees of "probate courts were to be given the same
effect as that usually attributed to those of a court of superior and general jurisdiction."
71
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (21).
72 Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82. This statute is like the Kansas statute cited in
note 68 supra.
64
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New York,'8 North Carolina, 74 Ohio,75 Oklahoma,76 Rhode Island,11
and Vermont,78 Thus the first assumption of jurisdiction prevails a:nd
excludes subsequent action by other courts, subject to correction by three
methods: (I) by revocation of letters in the first court; ( 2) by appeal
from the decision of that court; or (3) by collateral attack when the
'-'want of jurisdiction appears on the same record."
The application of these provisions against collateral attack would
seem to prevent another probate court from granting letters on the 'same
estate. But even though a second grant of letters is not contested, and
thus not made the subject of attack, the probate court there should
nevertheless defer or stay all action until the determination-by the first
court has become final. Thus if it should be duly determine&in the first
court, or on appeal from that court, that the decedent's domicile was not
in its county, then the proceedings there should be dismissed, and the
proceedings next begun in another county should contimie. If perchance a third court were involved, the same rule as to stay should likewise apply to it. This idea of a positive duty on the part of other courts
to stay proceedings first found form in the Minnesota statute 79 referred
to above and was later embodied in the Kansas Probate Code so with "One
slight amendment. All this, of course, implies voluntary obedience by
18

N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 44. The form of this statute
differs from the others. "Jurisdiction, once duly exercised over any matter by a Surrogate's Court, excludes the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction by another Surrogate's
Court over the same matter, .••. Where ••• letters testamentary or of administration
have been duly issued from .•. a Surrogate's Court having jurisdiction, all further proceedings to be taken ..• with respect to the same estate •.• must be taken in_ the same
court."
74
•
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie; 1943) § 28-2. "The clerk who first gains and,
exercises jurisdicti'on under this chapter thereby acquires sole and exclusive j,urisdiction
over the decedent's estate."
.
n Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, Supp. 1943) § 10504-15. The result in Ohio
is implicit under this statute providing_ for notice and hearing and from_ which a rigJit
of appeal exists.
7
{1 Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 58, § 7. "The county court of the county in which
application is first made for letters testamentary or of administration ... excludes the
jurisdiction of the county court of every other county."
77
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § l.
78
Vt. Pub. Law~ (1933) § 2727. "When a probate court has first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, . . . such co.urt shall ha.ve
jurisdiction of the disposition and settlement of such estate to the exclusion of other
probate courts." Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2728 corresponds to the Wi5<;onsin statute
quoted above. See note 66 supra.
79
Minn. Stat. {r941) § 525.82.
8
° Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2203.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

the courts which entertain proceedings later in point of time, or compulsory obedience by appropriate proceedings in a superior or supervisory
tribunal.81 The net result is orderly procedure and the exercise of jurisdiction at any given time by one court only.
While this method may, in isolated instances, result in a determination of domicile, and hence place of administration, in a place not too
convenient to some of the interested parties, it has the advantages of
orderly procedure, the exercise of jurisdiction at any given time by one
court only, the avoidance of duplication of function by the courts, and
the prevention of more than one action against a debtor to the estate.
Also the effect upon titles is salutary where conflict between courts cannot have more than momentary duration. '
Perhaps it is not enough to say that when proceedings have been
commenced in one court, similar proceedings shall be- stayed elsewhere.
It may be well to add that the jurisdiction assumed by the first court
is not only exclusive and exhaustive but also that any action of a second
court is void. The idea is implicit in the fundamental conception of
probate jurisdiction that where one. court assumes jurisdiction over the
administration of an estate, the exercise of control by another court over
such estate is thereby exhausted and any attempted or purported exercise of control by another court is void. -In short, the power is exclusive;
its exercise by one court exhausts the power, subject to the condition that
if such court should relinquish its control over the estate, the power
would be subject to exercise anew by another court.

B. As to Nonresident Decedents
In the case of resident decedents it has beln observed that conflicts
in jurisdiction may arise because of two or more independent determinations of domicile within the state. As far as any one state is concerned,
it has been generally assumed that a person could have but one legal
domicile within the state. Hence by some final determination, either in
the· probate court first entertaining jurisdiction or on appeal from that
court, the fact of domicile will be determined so as to be binding
throughout the state as far as that administration is concerned. In other
words, only one court is entitled to undertake the administration in the
first instance. 82
81
State ex rel. Carter v. Hall, 141 Mo. App. 642, ·125 S.W. 559 (1910); Sewell
v. Christison, County Judge, 114 Okla. 177,245 P. 632 (1926).
82
ATKINSON, WILLS 560, 562 (1937).
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In the case of nonresident decedents there may be a real choice as to
venue in two different situations. In addition there is a third.situation in
which each of two or more probate courts may undertake an administration proceeding approximately concurrently on the basis of an erroneous representation and a finding that the necessary factual basis for
venue e:ip.sts. Each of these situations contains the seeds for two or more
simultaneous administrations with their attendant evils. Eaoh deserves
a method of resolution.
The first two present genuine choices open to those who may be
interested in applying for administration. Thus one type of statute provides in effect that letters may be granted in any county where the
decedent left assets.88 Companion statutes here frequently add that the
court of that county in which application is first made, and which first
grants letters or otherwise assumes jurisdiction, shall have exclusive juris'd.iction; 8¼ or that "the jurisdiction assumed by any court, insofar as it
depends on the location of the decedent's estate, shall not be contested
except on appeal or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record." 85 Another common type of statute in the western states
modelled after the California Code specifies various bases of venue in
categorical order and particularly provides that venue "in. all other
cases shall be in the county where applicat'ion for letters is first made." 86
88

See note 30 supra.
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-101; Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 301;
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4888; Del. Rev. Code (1940) § 3807; Idaho Code Ann.
(1932) §§ 15-101 and 15-102; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-302; Iowa Code
(Reichmann, 1939) § II824; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 592203; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 16; Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, §
7; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §§ 27.3178 (22) and (120); Minn. Stat. (1941) §
525.82; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 10018 and
10019; Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 30-313; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer,
Supp. 1941) § 9882.01; N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937 §§ 44 and 46;
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-2; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) §
8526; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 105u-4; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit.
58, §§ 6 and,7; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § 3; S.D. Code Ann (1939)
§ 35.0102; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3294; Utah Code -i\nn. (1943)
§ 102-1-3; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2727; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932)
§ 1377; Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.04; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §
88-208.
.
85
See notes 66-78 supra.
86
A complete list of such statutes is as follows: Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) § 38-101;
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 301; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 15-101; Mont.
Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 10018; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer,
Supp. 1941) § 9882.01; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8526; Okla. Stat. Ann.
(1941) tit. 58, §§ 5-7; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0101; Utah Code Ann. (1943)
8
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Both of these species of statutes providing for alternative places of
venue, it will be noted, deal with cases where any one of several courts
is entitled, in the first instance, to undertake the administration on a
particular estate. Once proceedings have been commenced in any court,
all the estate of the decedent is brought under its jurisdiction and control, 87 and further jurisdiction in any other court is no longer possible.
Resolution of the conflict here is sometimes, but not always, contained
in the statute itself or in the companion statutes mentioned above.
Priority in time determines the power to proc~ed.
The third possibility mentioned above in which conflicts are likely
to occur, arises, ,to put an example, under statutes authorizing the administr;ition of estates in the county where the land or estate of the nonresident decedent, or the greater part thereof, is located. Courts of two
di:fferent counties may grant administration upon the belief that the
greater ,part of the decedent's estate lies there. Mathematically the
"greater" part may be in only one county, but before undertaking such
measurement, such jurisdiction needs definition in terms of value, area,
size, or some other appro'priate measuring stick. Without pursuing this
thought further, it is sufficient to point out that each of two or more
courts may honestly believe itself justified in assuming jurisdiction according to its measurement of an extraneous fact upon which its jurisdiction is made to depend. Again we must fall back upon the simple
· expedient of recognizing that the. first court to acquire jurisdiction is
§ 102-1-2; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) § 88-207. This same result is
implicit under the Kansas and Minnesota statutes, although not expressed in this manner. Likewise a similar construction obtains under the Texas and Washington statutes.
87
The term "jurisdiction" as used here refers merely to the power of a court to
take cognizance of the proceedings and control over the property through the executor
or administrator. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, its control extends to all property
ohhe estate throughout the state. Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 87; Cal. Prob.
Code (Deering, 1941) § 301; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4888; Del. Rev. Code
(1935) § 3807; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-302; Iowa Code (Reichmann1
1939) § 11825; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) ·§ 59-2203; Md. Ann.
Code (Flack, 1939) art. 93, § 16; Ma~s. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 7;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (120); Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82; Neb.
Comp. Stat. (Dorsey, 1929) § 30-313; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, Supp. 1941) §
9882.01; 'N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) §§ 44-46; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Michie, 1943) § 28-2; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 105II-4; Okla. Stat.
'Ann. (1941) tit. 58, §§ 6, 7; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § 3; S.C. Code
Ann. (1942) §§ 211, 220; S.D.,Code Ann. (1939) § 35.0102; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.
(Vernon, 1939) art. 3294; Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 102-1-3; Vt. Pub. Laws
_ (1933) § 2727; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1377; Wis. Stat. (1943)
§ 311.01; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann (Courtright, 1931) § 88-208.
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entitled to retain it,88 subject to deprivation of that jurisdiction only in
the manner indicated.

C. When Jurisdiction is Acquired
In addition to the statutes which specify priority as between two -or
more permissible places of administration according to the .county in
whi~h the appli'cation for letters is first filed, 89 many statutes provide
that the court in which proceedings are "first commenced" 90 or "first
legally commenced," 91 or the court "where administration is first lawfully granted" 92 or which shall "first take cognizance theryof by- the
commencement of proceedings" 93 shall be entitled to retain jru-i.sdiction
over the administration of the estate to the exclusion of all other probate
courts within the state. It is thereby intended to specify the tame when
a court acquires control and to declare an order of priority as between
two or more courts. A definition of this precise point of time i_s essential
whenever legal proce~dings are in rem. This problem has beep. an acute
one in states without any specific legislation on the subject as well as
under the variously phrased statutes mentioned above. From an examination of the statutes and decisions it appears that there are two views
as to just when a court acquires jurisdiction: (I) when the application,
or petition for letters is filed with the court; and (2) when the court,
acting on the application, appoints an executor or administrator to' administer the estate, thus assuming control over it.
The first view is predicated upon the theory that the proceedings
88
Bremer v. Lake Erie and W.R.R., 318 Ill. II, 148 N.E. 862 (1ty25); In re
Estate of Kladivo, 188 Iowa 471, 176 N.W. 262 (1920); Bolton v. Sc1\.riever, 135
N.Y. 65, 31 N.E. 1001 (1892); Sewell v. Christison, County Judge, II4, Okla. 177,
245 P. 632 (1926). See statutes cited in note 87 supra.·
89
See notes 84 and 86 supra.
9
°Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2203; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930)
c. 75, § 16.
91
Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82.
·
92
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 61, § 87; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 3807; Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-302; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 ~120); Neb.
Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 30-313; N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill,
1937) § 44 (but cf.·§ 46 wherein the time of filing the-petition has been made the
criterion); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 28-2 ("the clerk who first gai_ns
and exercises jurisdiction") Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 105u-4; R.I.
Gen. Laws Ann. (1938) c. 569, § 3.
·
·
93
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 488.8; Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § II824;
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 7; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943.) § 27.3178
(22); N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 44; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2727;
Wis. Stat. (1943) § 253.04.
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are commenced by the filing of a petition for administration; and that
the subsequent action of the court in acting on the petition is but a continuation and part of the proceedings already commenced. The simple
lodging of the petition for letters vests the court with jurisdiction and
control, precluding; action by another court. A few statutes specifically
provide that a probate proceeding may be commenced by filing a petition and causing it to be set for hearing. 94
The second view stems from the theory of res judicata, that where
two actions involving the same issue are pending at the same time, the
first one to be determined by, final judgment shall control and may
serve as a bar in any other action between the same parties involving
that same issue. 95 This, of course, is a well-recognized rule of civil
procedure. Judicial action, not the mere filing of a petition, is the sine
qua non of jurisdiction.
It has also been said that a court can only acquire jurisdiction in an
in rem proceeding by doing some act which is equivalent to seizing the
res; that since a probate proceeding is in rem, no jurisdiction over the
estate can exist until the court does some affirmative act amounting to
a seizure, such as appointing a personal representative to take charge of
the estate.
Undoubtedly in the vast majority of cases the court to which a
petition is first presented will likewise be the first to grant letters. But
such is not always the case, especially where notice for a hearing on the
petition must be given for a specified minimum length of time. A
second court to which a petition is later addressed may speed up its
action to such a degree that it is the first to grant letters. Thus where
the hearing and order are in reverse order to that of the filing of the
applications, it becomes important to determine the precise time when
jurisdiction may be said to attach so as to preclude jurisdiction by another court.
The authorities are divided in their views on this point. Among
the states having statutes specifying jurisdiction upon the commencement of proceedings, or having no legislation on the subject, New
94 Such statutes are found in New York, Kansas and North Dakota. See N.Y.
Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) § 48; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp.
1943) § 59-2204; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8530; Minnesota formerly had
such a statute, Minn. Stat. Ann. (Mason, 1927) § 8708, but neither this section nor
any similar prov~sion \vas adopted as a part of the Minnesota Probate Code of 1935.
However the same result will obtain under Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82. See note
97 infra.
·
95
2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., c. IO (1925). See also Sewell v. Christison,
County Judge, 114 Okla. 177, 245 P. 632 (1926).
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York,96 Minnesota,97 Missouri,08 Kansas,99 North Dakota,100 and
Texas 101 are committed to the first view, saying that the commencement
of administration proceedings by the filing of a petition is conclusive
as to the time when the court acquires jurisdiction; 102 and that any
subsequent proceeding in any other court is without jurisdiction and
void. The New York statute, for example, provides that "jl.!lrisdiction,
once duly exercised over any matter by a Surrogate's Court, excludes
the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction by another SurrogMe's Court
over the same matter...." It was held at a very early date under this
statute that the presentation of a petition for probate, alleging residence
of the deced~nt within the county, gives exclusive jurisdiction to try the
question of residence, of which the court cannot be deprived by subsequent proceedings in the surrogate's court of another colilnty.108 In
addition, statutes exist in twenty-eight states explicitly giving priority in
given circumstances to the court in which an application for letters is
first filed.
The second view also has its adherents. Delaware,1°"' Indiana,105
Nebraska,106 New Hampshire,101 .Ohio,1° 8 Oklahoma,100· Rhode Is96
N.Y. Surrogate's Court Act (Cahill, 1937) §§ 44, 45 and 46; In re Daniel's
Will, 140 Misc. 89, 249 N.Y.S .. 436 (1931); In re Humpfner's Estate, 146 Misc.
461, 263 N.Y.S. 309 (1933); In re Feinberg's Estate, 155 Misc. 844, 280 N.Y.S.
540 (1935).
97
Minn. Stat. Ann. (Mason, 1927) § 8708; Hanson v. Nygaard, 105 Minn. 30,
II7 N.W. 235, 127 Am. St. Rep. 523 (1908); In re Estate of Martin, 188 Minn.
408, 247 N.W. 515 (1933); In re Gilray's Estate, 193 Minn. 349, 258 N.W. 584
(1935).
98
In the Matter of the Estate of Greening, 232 Mo. App. 78, 89 S.W. (2d) 123
(1936), noted in l Mo. L. REV. 192 (1936). Here the court said th~t the order of
appointment controlled, but that this related back to the "very inception of the proceedings" when the will and application for letters were filed.
99
_ Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943) § 59-2203.
100
N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 8526.
101
Stewart v. Poinboeuf, I I I Tex. 299, 233 S.W. 1095 (1921).
102
In addition to these five states, there are some 24 additional states where statutes
specify the time of application under certain circumstances as equivalent to the time
when jurisdiction may be said to attach. See note 84 supra. This makes a total of 29
states where the filing of the application may be said to co~fer jurisdiction, at least to the
extent of determining priority over other courts of coordinate authority.
108
Matter of Buckley, 41 Hun (N.Y.) 106 (1886). See REDFIELD, LAW AND
PRACTICE oF SuRROGATEs' CouRTs IN NEw YoRK, 4th ed., n6 (1890)
mDel. Rev. Code (1935) § 3807.
105
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-302.
106
Neb. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Dorsey, 1929) § 30-313.
107
Tilton v. O'Conner, 68 N.H. 215, 44 A. 303 (1894).
108
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 10511-4.
109
Sewell v. Christison, County Judge, l 14 Okla. 177, 245 P. 632 (1926). See
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land110 and South Carolina 111 do not regard their probate courts as acquiring jurisdiction without some positive action, such as acting on an
application by granting letters. Such judicial order or judgment, they
say, is the only means by which the court ,may grasp jurisdiction.112 A
dozen applications may be pending in as many different courts, but
jurisdiction exists in none until acted upon. Thus in an early California
case it was said that the statute in effect at that time did not contemplate
the "presentation of a petition as ~he means of giving the Court jurisdiction," but as information to the co~t.113
In addition, statutes exist in Connecticut, 114 Iowa,115 Maine,116
Massachusetts 111 Michigan 118 North Carolina 119Vermont 120 and Wis
' court which shall' first take cognizance of·consin 121 to the' effect that the
the administration of an estate by the commencement of proceedings
shall be entitled to retain it to the exclusion of every other court. Thus
far, the.se st;ttutes have received no clear judicial construction as to just
when proceedings are commenced.
also Jackson v. Haney, 166 Okla. 13, 25 P. (2d) 771 (1933), involving conflicting
jurisdiction in the appointment of a guardian for a minor.
110
R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 569, § 3·
111
Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Castleberry, (C.C.A. 4th, 1904) 131 F. 175.
11 2
- ln the statutes of Delaware, Indiana and Nebraska, cited in notes 104, 105,
and 106 supra, it is specifically provided that the administration first lawfully granted
shall exclude the jurisdiction of every other court.
118
In the matter of the Estate of Howard, 22 Cal. 395 at 398 (1863). However,
the court here was discussing. two statutes entirely dissimilar to those under consideration.
The sole purpose of quoting from the opinion is to indicate the early conception of the
California court as to the office of the petition for probate. Indeed the opinion indicated
that a petition was solely for the purpose of indicating to the court a willingness on the
part of the executor to accept his trust.
114
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 4888.
115
. Iowa Code (Reichmann, 19 3 9) ·§ II 8 24.
116
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 16.
117
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 7. In addition to this section, another Massachusetts statute is unique in providing that "If it appears before final decree
in any proceeding pending in a probate court that said proceeding was begun in the
wrong county, said court may order the proceeding with all papers relating thereto to
be removed to the probate court for the proper county, and it shall thereupon be entered
and pending in the last mentioned court as if originally commenced therein, and all
prior proceedings otherwise regularly taken shall thereupon be valid." Mass. Ann. Laws
(Michie, 193 2) c. 215, § SA.
118
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (22). Cf.§ 27.3178 (120) which gives
priority to the administration first legally granted.
119
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann._ (Michie, 1943) § 28-2. "The clerk who first gains
and exercises jurisdiction •.• over the decedent's estate."
120
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 2727.
121
Wis. Stat. ( 1943) § 253.04. Cf. § 311.01 which gives priority to the administration first legally granted. -

1 944]

VENUE OF PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION

493

In favor of the first rule it has been said to be fairer to predicate
priority on the filing of the first petition, provided the respective applications for administration have not been made with such haste as to
suggest some positive fraud or collusion. As said in a Texas case: 122
"The fairest and most reasonable test is priority· in i!:lvoking
the exercise of jurisdiction.... The date of an adjudication on his
application may be delayed by ·circumstances beyond the applicant's control, such as the number of causes on the court's docket
or time taken by the court to render a decision. One ought not to
lose his right to an adjudication, properly sought, because' a clerk
or sheriff is delayed in issuing or serving process duly applfod for,
nor because an earlier adjudication is secured from another court."
S1,1ch a rule makes the acquisition of jurisdiction independent df the
speed with which two probate courts might otherwise move toward acquiring jurisdiction by granting letters sooner than they would in the
ordinary course of events. Where such application is for domiciliary
administration and predicated upon domicile, fraud or collmiion, if it
exists, may be corrected in most cases in the probate court itself or by
appeal.12s
If there is any weakness in the first view, it may be exemplified by
supposing that.the first of two courts in which application for letters has
been filed, refuses to ·grant letters or otherwise proceed. The sudden
cessation of a jurisdiction over the decedent's estate whicla the court says
it never had, seems an anomoly. In answer it may be said that jurisdiction, or the potential power to assume jurisdiction, exists from the
instant the application was filed, but the court terminates its juris4iction
and thus makes it possible for another court to take it up. This corresponds to the.express statutory statement that proceedings may be.commenced by the mere filing of a petition for probate or administration.
Where such statutes exist, it cannot be denied that jurisdiction exists
from the time the petition is filed.
122

Stewart v. Poinboeuf,

III

Tex. 299 at 305,233 S.W. 1095 (1921).

128 In addition to the remedy by appeal, the assumption of jurisdiction may always
be questioned in the probate court directly, although the time for making such a direct
attack varies in the different states. Kennedy v. Simmons, 308 Mass. 4.31, 32 N.E.
(2d) 715 (1941) (at any time, by analogy of the common law and equity -i::ourts to correct their decrees by bill of review); In re Estate of Neely, 136 Me. 79, 1 A. (2d)
772 (1938) (even after appeal time; Eckilson v. Greene, 61 R.I. 394, 1 A. (2d) IIJ
(1938) (until the time for appeal has expired); Hotchkiss v. Ladd's Estate, 62 Vt. 209
( I 890). Statutes in California and Maine make the grant of letters and assumption
of jurisdiction final except on appeal, and not subject to collateral attack except for
fraud. Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § 302; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 75, § 16.
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The second view, based upon the doctrine of res judicata, has the
· support of history and of logical consistency. Under civil procedure two
or more actions may pend between the same parties and involve the
same issue. Ordinarily no serious harm results from the mere pendency
of duplicate actions. The ultimate legal rights of the parties are not
affected until final judgment. The same cannot be said of a probate
proceeding, which is essentially a proceeding in rem.124 The rights of
parties interested in the estate are not affected merely by the decree of
final distribution; they are affected by every step taken in the proceeding. In consequence, the jurisdiction of the court must attach at
the commencement of the proceeding in order to insure that the court
which undertakes to supervise administration of the estate has the
exclusive jurisdiction and power to make all necessary orders. Otherwise we witness an unseemly race between courts of coordinate jurisdiction and a species of competition completely unworthy of the judicial
process. As was aptly said in a recent Oklahoma case: "To hold that the
time of appointment determines jurisdiction would ... promote mad
races between courts of coordinate jurisdiction to see which could enter
a final order first. This would tend to discourage that deliberation so
essential to a determination of the rights of parties in judicial tribunals." 125
•
In answer to the argument that the in rem character of the proceeding compels the conclusion that it is not initiated until the seizure of the
res, two things may be said. First, this is a question of venue and not of
jurisdiction, and if it is more convenient to say that the proceeding is
commenced by the filing of the petition no unyielding principle of jurisdiction prevents such a statute. Second, whatever· may be said as to a
proceeding quasi in rem, there is no rule of law that seizure of the res
is always necessary in order for a court to acquire jurisdiction in a proceeding strictly in rem.126 The analogy of the admiralty proceeding is
not and should not be followed in probate matters.
124

ATKINSON, WILLS 438-440 (1937); Atkinson, "Old Principles and New Ideas
Concerning Probate Court Procedure," 23 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 137 at 138 (1939);
Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 64 N.W. 99, 69 L.R.A. 785 (1895).
125
Jackson v. Haney, 166 Okla. 13 at 21, 25 P. (2d) 771 (1933). It should be
stated that this quotation is from a concurring opinion written by a judge who believed
that jurisdiction attached upon the filing of the petition for letters, contrary to the
opinion held by the majority of the court. See note 109 supra.
126
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 20 S. Ct. 410 (1900). See also 2 PAGE, WILLS,
3d ed., 38 (1941) where it is said:
.
"It is the presence of the thing within the state which confers jurisdiction in rem.
It is sometimes said that the seizure Qf the thing is necessary; but this would seem to
be taking a detail in the enforcement of the jurisdiction, which is quite necessary in
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The provision of the Model Probate Code,121 following the l;mguage of the Minnesota and Kansas Probate Codes,128 has embodied
the first view. It has not only expressed this view, but it has specifically
provided what shall be done in other probate courts where proceedings
have also been- started. Such are to be stayed there pending a decision
in the :first court as to whether such proceedings are in a permissible
county under the statute. If jurisdiction is assumed there, the second
court, "after making and retaining a true copy of the entire file, shall
transmit the original to the proper county." On the other ha~d, if the
first court should decline to take jurisdiction, the second couFt becomes
free to proceed.
Moreover, it is immaterial whether the proceedings first begun are
"legal" or not. The question of domicile within the cou~ty,. assets
within the county, or other basis for app'ropriate venue, or whether the
.first county is one of several counties in which administration might
have been begun, is left for final decision in the first court to which an
application is presented. But that decision is not necessarily limited to
the original decision of this court. It may be redetermined on appeal or
in the probate court itself by motion to revoke the letters.129 By this
means it is ordinarily possible for anyone to, contest the first proceeding
until a final conclusion is reached. But when the court in which proceedings are first filed renders a final decision that it has jurisdiction in the
administration of the estate, that court is entitled to proceed, free from
competition elsewhere in the state.180
A Massachusetts statute 181 permits a change of venue at any time
before final d~cree if it appears that the proceeding was begun in the
wrong county. Statutes in Arkansas 182 are ev~n broader, permitting removal of an administration from one county to another upon the petition of the personal representative or a majority of the heirs stating
that the greater portion of the property is in such other county or that a
'

the case of movable property but not so necessary in the case of immovable property,
and turning it into a rule of jurisdiction. Fairness requires that some kind of notice
be given so that those who have claims to the property may assert them in time. The "
due process clause of our constitution may make void or erroneous a decree which is
rendered without such notice. It is not, however, the notice which gives the jurisdiction. It is the presence of the thing within the state."
127
See note l 2 supra.
128
Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.82; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1943)
§ 59-2203.
129
See cases cited in note 123 supra.
uo See the Minnesota and Kansas statutes cited in note 128 supra.
181
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) c. 215, § 8A.
182
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) §§ 229-238.
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majority of the heirs wish such removal. Such flexibility of venue for
the administration of estates was not noted elsewhere, although a similar transfer of venue in guardianship proceedings exists in Minnesota.133
Such provisions as these, although isolated, reflect a tendency to adjust
probate procedure to the interests of convenience.134
133
Minn. Stat. (1941) § 525.57. See also Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §
1603 which provides that a guardianship proceeding may be transferred to "any other
county which at the time of such transfer woulcl have jurisdiction to issue original
letters in such proceeding." In the case of a testamentary trust Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) § II28 provides for a transfer of the trust proceedings upon petition of the
trustees or any interested party stating th~ reasons for such transfer. Presumably convenience alone would be sufficient.
134 The venue section of the Model Probate Code has Qeen drafted to permit a
change of venue and tr~nsfer of proceedings in the interest of convenience. See note
12 supra.

